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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the uniqueness issue of open-loop equilibrium investment
strategies of dynamic mean-variance portfolio selection problems with random coefficients.
A unified method is developed to treat both the problems with deterministic risk-free
return rate, state-dependent risk aversion, and that with full random coefficients, constant
risk aversion. To do so, some new necessity conditions for the existence of equilibrium
investment strategies are established, which considerably extends the analogue in [9] with
distinctive ideas. Some new interesting facts are revealed. For example, if risk-free return
rate is random, it is shown that there exists a unique open-loop equilibrium investment
strategy relying on initial wealth, even when risk aversion is merely a constant but not
state-dependent.
Keywords. dynamic mean-variance portfolio selection problems, time inconsistency, unique-
ness of open-loop equilibrium investment strategy, Riccati equations.
AMS Mathematics subject classification. 91B51, 93E99, 60H10.
1 Introduction
The classical Markowitz’s mean-variance portfolio selection problem is well-known in modern
investment portfolio theory. Due to practical requirement, it is natural to extend the original
single period framework into multi-period scenario. If so, the strategy at one moment may not
be optimal at next moment. This phenomenon is the so-called time inconsistency.
In order to chase optimal choice, one has to keep changing the investment strategy in a naive
way all the time. On the other hand, the time consistency of policies is also fundamental in many
situations. Therefore, the notion of time consistent equilibrium control/strategy has attracted
much attention in the literature. Since mean-variance portfolio selection problems have some
inherent connection with time inconsistent stochastic linear quadratic (SLQ) optimal control
problems, we first take a revisit of the later.
As to time inconsistent stochastic linear quadratic problems, there are two types of equi-
librium controls: open-loop equilibrium controls and closed-loop equilibrium controls. The
∗The research was supported by the NSF of China under grant 11231007, 11401404 and 11471231.
†School of Mathematics, Sichuan University, Chengdu, P. R. China. Email:wtxiao2014@scu.edu.cn.
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first notion was introduced and investigated carefully in [8], [9] with deterministic coefficients.
The second one was considered in [2] and [17] with two independent approaches. At this very
moment, one may ask: what are the differences between these two notions? How are they
relate to traditional optimal controls? If the time inconsistency in linear quadratic problems
disappears, it was proved in [12] that open-loop equilibrium controls, which are characterized
by first-order, second-order necessary optimality conditions, are strictly weaker than open-loop
optimal controls, while closed-loop equilibrium controls reduce to closed-loop optimal controls.
Related topics on time inconsistent SLQ problems can also be found in [7], [11], [16] and the
references therein.
We return back to our mean-variance problems, where above two notions are referred as
open-loop equilibrium (investment) strategies and closed-loop equilibrium (investment) strate-
gies. The existence and uniqueness of the former notion was given in [8], [9] when partial
involved coefficients are random. Later, [14] extended it into the general asset-liability manage-
ment problem with full random coefficients. As to closed-loop equilibrium investment strategy,
it was firstly discussed in [1] under the Markovian framework. Since the equilibrium strategy in
[1] does not depend on initial wealth, the authors in [3] introduced one class of mean-variance
problems with state dependent risk aversion parameter, and discussed the existence of the as-
sociated equilibrium investment strategy. Later, [10] developed a unified method to treat the
problems in both [1] and [3], and obtained the uniqueness of closed-loop equilibrium investment
strategies. Just recently, [13] extended the conclusions in [1] into the general non-Markovian
setting. One interesting fact is the obtained equilibrium strategies are allowed to rely on initial
wealth, even though the risk aversion parameter is a constant. We refer to [5], [6], [15], [18],
etc., for more related investigations.
In this paper, we discuss the uniqueness of open-loop equilibrium investment strategy when
all the coefficients are random. As we mentioned above, the uniqueness of open-loop equilibrium
investment strategy was given in [9], where the risk-free return rate is deterministic. In [14], the
existence of open-loop equilibrium investment strategy was given with full random coefficients,
while the uniqueness issue was absent. Therefore, the aim of our study is to fill this gap. On
the other hand, as was shown in [12], open-loop equilibrium controls (which is comparable with
our open-loop equilibrium investment strategy) are normally weaker than open-loop optimal
controls, even in classical time consistent setting. When discussing a weak notion, uniqueness
is especially important from the theoretical point of view.
To study the uniqueness, we first obtain a necessary condition for open-loop equilibrium
investment strategy with random coefficients. In contrast with [9], the randomness of risk-
free return rate leads to the appearance of a unbounded stochastic process. As a result, the
approach developed in [8] fails to work here (see Remark 3.2). To get round this difficult, we
establish some proper convergence tricks (see Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3) which have independent
interest. Using these necessity conclusions, we give a unified uniqueness treatment on mean-
variance problems with deterministic risk-free return rate, state-dependent risk aversion, and
that with full random coefficients, constant risk aversion. As to the former problem, our method
is different from that in [9], and is simpler. As to the later one, there are some new interesting
facts arising, see Subsection 4.1.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some notations, spaces are
introduced and the financial problem is formulated. Section 3 is aim to provide new necessary
conditions for the existence of open-loop equilibrium investment strategies. Section 4 is devoted
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to treating the uniqueness of equilibrium investment strategy. In Section 5, some concluding
remarks are present.
2 Preliminary notations and model formulation
Through out this paper, (Ω,F ,P, {Ft}t≥0) is a filtered complete probability space, {W (t), t ≥ 0}
is a F := {Ft}t≥0-adapted one-dimensional Brownian motion.
For H := Rn,Rn×m, etc., 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T , l ∈ N, we define
L2Ft(Ω;H) :=
{
X : Ω→ H
∣∣ X is Ft measurable, E|X |2 <∞},
L2
F
(s, t;H) :=
{
X : [s, t]× Ω→ H
∣∣ X(·) is measurable and
F-adapted, E
[ ∫ t
s
|X(r)|2dr
]
<∞
}
,
L2
F
(
Ω;C([s, t];H)
)
:=
{
X : [s, t]× Ω→ H
∣∣ X(·) is measurable, F-adapted,
has continuous paths, E
(
sup
r∈[s,t]
|X(r)|2
)
<∞
}
,
L∞
F
(Ω;C([s, t];R)) :=
{
X : [s, t]× Ω→ H
∣∣ X(·) is measurable, F-adapted,
has continuous paths, esssup
ω∈Ω
sup
r∈[s,t]
|X(r)|2 <∞
}
,
Ll
F
(Ω;L2(s, t;R)) :=
{
X : [s, t]× Ω→ H
∣∣ X(·) is measurable and F-adapted
E
[ ∫ t
s
|X(r)|2dr
] l
2
<∞
}
.
We consider a financial market where two assets are traded continuously on [0, T ]. Suppose
the price of bond evolves as{
dS0(s) = r(s)S0(s)ds, s ∈ [0, T ],
S0(0) = s0 > 0,
and the risky asset is described by{
dS(s) = S(s)
{
b(s)ds+ σ(s)dW (s)
}
, s ∈ [0, T ],
S(0) = s1 > 0.
Here r > 0 is the risk-free return rate, b is the expected return rate of risky asset, σ is the
corresponding volatility rate.
(H0) Suppose r, b, σ are bounded and F-adapted processes, and there exists constant δ > 0
such that |σ|2 ≥ δ.
Given initial capital x > 0, β := b− r, θ := βσ−1, the investor’s wealth X satisfies{
dX(s) =
[
r(s)X(s) + β(s)u(s)
]
ds+ u(s)σ(s)dW (s),
X(0) = x,
(2.1)
3
where u is the capital invested in the risky asset.
At anytime t ∈ [0, T ), the objective of a mean-variance portfolio choice model is to choose
an investment strategy to minimize
J(u(·); t,X(t)) = Vart
[
X(T )
]
− [γ1 + γ2X(t)]Et
[
X(T )
]
, (2.2)
where Et[·] := E[·|Ft], γ1 ≥ 0, γ2 ≥ 0 are constants satisfying γ1γ2 = 0.
In this paper, we consider the open-loop equilibrium (investment) strategy of above problem.
To this end, for t ∈ [0, T ), v ∈ L2Ft(Ω;R), ε > 0, we define u
v,ε := u∗ + vI[t,t+ε].
Definition 2.1 Given x ∈ R, u∗ ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;R) is called an open-loop equilibrium investment
strategy if for any t ∈ [0, T ), (X∗, u∗) satisfying (2.1),
lim
ε→0
J(uv,ε(·); t,X∗(t))− J
(
u∗(·)
∣∣
[t,T ]
; t,X∗(t)
)
ε
≥ 0. (2.3)
In order to give a clearer picture of u∗, we introduce the following notion.
Definition 2.2 A pair of (Θ∗, ϕ∗) ∈ Lp
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;R))×L2
F
(0, T ;R), p > 2, is called an open-
loop equilibrium operator if for any x ∈ R, u∗ := (Θ∗X∗ + ϕ∗) ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;R), and u∗ is an
open-loop equilibrium investment strategy associated with x, where
dX∗(s) =
[
[r(s) + β(s)Θ∗(s)]X∗(s) + β(s)ϕ∗(s)
]
ds
+σ(s)
[
Θ∗(s)X∗(s) + ϕ∗(s)
]
dW (s), s ∈ [0, T ],
X∗(0) = x.
(2.4)
Here (Θ∗, ϕ∗) does not depend on initial wealth x, while u∗ indeed does. In addition, the
integrability of (Θ∗, ϕ∗) ensures that (2.4) admits a unique continuous strong solution X∗.
Remark 2.1 Let us look at the condition γ1γ2 = 0, which includes if and only if (i): γ1 =
γ2 = 0; (ii): γ1 = 0, γ2 > 0; (iii) γ1 > 0, γ2 = 0.
For the second case, if risk-free return rate r is deterministic, the equilibrium strategy u∗ :=
Θ∗X∗ indeed exists ([8]). Plugging it into (2.1), the equilibrium wealth process X∗(·) > 0.
Hence
J(u∗(·); t,X∗(t))
γ2X∗(t)
=
1
γ2X∗(t)
Vart
[
X∗(T )
]
− Et
[
X∗(T )
]
, (2.5)
where γ(x) := 1
γ2x
represents the state-dependent risk aversion.
For the third case, the equilibrium strategy of form u∗ := Θ∗X∗+ϕ∗ also exists, even when
r is random ([14]). Hence
J(u∗(·); t,X∗(t))
γ1
=
1
γ1
Vart
[
X∗(T )
]
− Et
[
X∗(T )
]
, (2.6)
where constant 1
γ1
represents the constant risk aversion.
Notice that the right hand of both (2.5) and (2.6) are the original and standard forms to
describe the cost functional of mean-variance problems.
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We look at the case when γ1γ2 = 0 does not hold, i.e., γ1 > 0, γ2 > 0. According to Remark
3.1 next, it is impossible to always keep
X∗(t) ≥ 0, γ1 + γ2X
∗(t) > 0, t ∈ [0, T ).
Consequently, there is no way to equivalently construct a cost functional of form
Ĵ(u(·); t,X(t)) := f(x)Vart
[
X∗(T )
]
− Et
[
X∗(T )
]
, f ′ ≤ 0,
by J(u(·); t,X(t)) such that u∗ is an equilibrium investment strategy in the sense of Definition
2.1. That is to say, the original interpretation of mean-variance problem is lost. Based on it,
we will not discuss this type of problem.
In the sequel, K is a generic constant which varies in different context. Moreover, we may
suppress the reference to the time variable whenever necessary.
3 Necessary conditions of open-loop equilibrium invest-
ment strategy
In this section, we derive some necessary conditions for the existence of open-loop equilibrium
investment strategies. They help us discuss the uniqueness issue in the next section.
We first look at a motivational case of γ2 = 0. Given proper (Θ, ϕ), s ∈ [0, T ], we consider
dP1(s) = −
{
2r(s)P1(s) + (P1(s)β(s) + Λ1(s)σ(s))Θ(s)
}
ds+ Λ1(s)dW (s),
dP2(s) = −r(s)P2(s)ds+ Λ2(s)dW (s),
dP3(s) = −
[
r(s)P3(s) + (P3(s)β(s) + Λ3(s)σ(s))Θ(s)
]
ds+ Λ3(s)dW (s),
dP4(s) = −
[
P3(s)β(s) + Λ3(s)σ(s)
]
ϕ(s)ds + Λ4(s)dW (s),
dP5(s) = −
[
r(s)P5(s) +
[
P1(s)β(s) + Λ1(s)σ(s)
]
ϕ(s)
]
ds+ Λ5(s)dW (s),
P1(T ) = 2, P2(T ) = −2, P3(T ) = 1, P4(T ) = 0, P5(T ) = −γ1.
(3.1)
By Appendix B of [14], there exist (Θ, ϕ) and (Pi,Λi), 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, satisfying both (3.1) and{
β(P1 + P2P3) + σ(Λ1 + Λ2P3) + σ
2P1Θ = 0, a.s. a.e.
β(P2P4 + P5) + σ(Λ5 + Λ2P4) + σ
2P1ϕ = 0. a.s. a.e.
(3.2)
Moreover, under proper conditions (see Proposition 3.9 of [14]), for any x ∈ R, u := ΘX+ϕ is an
open-loop equilibrium investment strategy. In other words, (Θ, ϕ) is an open-loop equilibrium
operator in the sense of Definition 2.2.
At this moment, it is natural to ask: will all the open-loop equilibrium operator be obtained
through (3.2)? Is (3.2) a necessary condition for the existence of (Θ, ϕ)? We will give positive
answers even when γ2 6= 0.
At first, let us make the following hypothesis.
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(H1) There exists (Θ, ϕ) ∈ Lp
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;R))× L2
F
(0, T ;R), p > 2 such that for any x ∈ R,
u := (ΘX + ϕ) ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;R), where
dX(s) =
[
(r(s) + β(s)Θ(s))X(s) + β(s)ϕ(s)
]
ds
+
[
σ(s)Θ(s)X(s) + σ(s)ϕ(s)
]
dW (s), s ∈ [0, T ],
X(0) = x.
(3.3)
Fix t ∈ [0, T ), ε > 0, v ∈ L2Ft(Ω;R), let u
ε := u+ vI[t,t+ε] and X
ε be described as{
dXε(s) =
[
r(s)Xε(s) + β(s)uε(s)
]
ds+ σ(s)uε(s)dW (s), s ∈ [0, T ],
Xε(0) = x0.
(3.4)
As a result, for s ∈ [0, T ], Xε0(s) := X
ε(s)−X(s) satisfies{
dXε0(s) =
[
r(s)Xε0 (s) + β(s)vI[t,t+ε](s)
]
ds+ σ(s)vI[t,t+ε](s)dW (s),
Xε0(0) = 0.
(3.5)
The following estimate of Xε0 is easy to see,
Et sup
r∈[t,t+ε]
|Xε0(r)|
2 ≤ Kε, a.s., t ∈ [0, T ).
For t ∈ [0, T ], we introduce
Y (s, t) = 2X(T )− 2EtX(T )− γ1 +
∫ T
s
r(u)Y (u, t)du−
∫ T
s
Z(u, t)dW (u), s ∈ [t, T ],
Y ε0 (s, t) = X
ε
0(T )− EtX
ε
0(T ) +
∫ T
s
r(u)Y ε0 (u, t)du−
∫ T
s
Zε0(u, t)dW (u), s ∈ [t, T ],
Y0(s) = 1 +
∫ T
s
r(u)Y0(u)du−
∫ T
s
Z0(u)dW (u), s ∈ [0, T ].
(3.6)
Under (H1), system (3.6) is solvable with
(Y (·, t), Z(·, t)), (Y v,ε0 (·, t), Z
v,ε
0 (·, t)) ∈ L
2
F
(Ω;C([t, T ];R))× L2
F
(t, T ;R),
(Y0(·), Z0(·)) ∈ L
∞
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R))× L2
F
(t, T ;R), t ∈ [0, T ].
Moreover, it is easy to see that (P2,Λ2) = −2(Y0, Z0).
Lemma 3.1 Suppose (H0), (H1) hold. Then
J(uε(·); t,X(t))− J(u(·); t,X(t))
= Et
∫ t+ε
t
β(s)
[
Y ε0 (s, t) + Y (s, t)− γ2X(t)Y0(s)
]
ds · v
+Et
∫ t+ε
t
σ(s)
[
Zε0(s, t) + Z(s, t)− γ2X(t)Z0(s)
]
ds · v.
(3.7)
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Proof. From the definition of uε, it is a direct calculation that
J(uε(·); t,X(t))− J(u(·); t,X(t))
= Et
{[
2X(T )− 2EtX(T )− (γ1 + γ2X(t))
]
Xε0(T )
}
+Et
{
(Xε0(T )− EtX
ε
0(T ))X
ε
0(T )
}
.
By Itoˆ’s formula,
Et
{[
Xε0(T )− EtX
ε
0(T )
]
Xε0(T )
}
= Et
∫ t+ε
t
(β(s)Y ε0 (s, t) + σ(s)Z
ε
0 (s, t))ds · v,
Et
{[
2X(T )− 2EtX(T )− γ1
]
Xε0(T )
}
= Et
∫ t+ε
t
(β(s)Y (s, t) + σ(s)Z(s, t))ds · v,
Etγ2X(t)X
ε
0(T ) = γ2X(t)Et
∫ t+ε
t
(Y0(s)β(s) + Z0(s)σ(s))ds · v.
Then above (3.7) is easy to see.
We first treat the terms of (Y, Z) in Lemma 3.1. For t ∈ [0, T ], suppose
Y (s, t) = P1(s)X(s) + P2(s)Et
[
P3(s)X(s) + P4(s)
]
+ P5(s), s ∈ [t, T ], (3.8)
where Pi satisfies{
dPi(s) = Πi(s)ds+ Λi(s)dW (s), s ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
P1(T ) = 2, P2(T ) = −2, P3(T ) = 1, P4(T ) = 0, P5(T ) = −γ1.
Here Πi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, is to be determined. By Itoˆ’s formula,
dP1X =
[
P1(r + βΘ) + Π1 + Λ1σΘ
]
Xds+ (P1[σΘX + σϕ] + Λ1X)dW (s)
+(P1β + Λ1σ)ϕds,
dP2Et[P3X ] =
{
Π2Et[P3X ] + P2
{
Et
[
(P3r + P3βΘ+Π3 +Λ3σΘ)X
]
+Et
[
(P3β + Λ3σ)ϕ
]}}
ds+ Λ2Et[P3X ]dW (s),
dP2EtP4 = [Π2EtP4 + P2EtΠ4]ds+ Λ2EtP4dW (s).
As a result, one has{[
P1(r + βΘ) + Π1 + Λ1σΘ
]
X + (P1β + Λ1σ)ϕ
+Π2Et[P3X ] + P2
{
Et
[
(rP3 + βP3Θ+ Π3 +Λ3σΘ)X
]
+Et
[
(βP3 + Λ3σ)ϕ
]}
+Π2EtP4 + P2EtΠ4 +Π5
}
ds
+
{
Λ2Et[P3X ] + P1[σΘX + σϕ] + Λ2EtP4 + Λ5 + Λ1X
}
dW (s)
= d
[
P1X + P2Et(P3X + P4) + P5
]
= dY
=
[
− rP1X − rP2Et[P3X + P4]− rP5
]
ds+ Z(s, t)dW (s).
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Comparing the diffusion term, one has
Z = Λ2Et[P3X ] + P1[σΘX + σϕ] + Λ2EtP4 + Λ5 + Λ1X.
For the drift term,
P1(r + βΘ) + Π1 + Λ1σΘ+ rP1 = 0,
rP2 +Π2 = 0, P3r + P3βΘ +Π3 +Λ3σΘ = 0,
(P3β + Λ3σ)ϕ+Π4 = 0, (P1β + Λ1σ)ϕ+ rP5 +Π5 = 0.
Consequently, we introduce five BSDEs in above (3.1) and make the following assumption.
(H2) Suppose there exists (Θ, ϕ) such that for Pi in (3.1), and some p ∈ (2,∞), p
′ ∈ (1, 2),
(Pi,Λi) ∈ L
∞
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R))× Lp
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;R)), i = 1, 2, 3,
(Pj ,Λj) ∈ L
p′
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R))× Lp
′
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;R)), j = 4, 5.
(3.9)
For t ∈ [0, T ], and s ∈ [t, T ], we define
M(s, t) := P1(s)X(s) + P2(s)Et[P3(s)X(s) + P4(s)] + P5(s),
N(s, t) := P1(s)σ(s)[Θ(s)X(s) + ϕ(s)] + Λ1(s)X(s)
+Λ2(s)Et[P3(s)X(s) + P4(s)] + Λ5(s).
(3.10)
Notice that (Md, Nd) are well defined, where
Md(s) :=M(s, s), Nd(s) := N(s, s), s ∈ [0, T ].
Lemma 3.2 Suppose (H0), (H1), (H2) hold. Then
P
{
ω, Y (s, t) =M(s, t), ∀s ∈ [t, T ]
}
= 1,
P
{
ω, Z(s, t) = N(s, t)
}
= 1, s ∈ [t, T ]. a.e.
(3.11)
Moreover, for almost t ∈ [0, T ], there exists sequence {ε
(t)
n }n≥1 such that lim
n→∞
ε
(t)
n = 0 and
lim
n→∞
[ 1
ε
(t)
n
Et
∫ t+ε(t)n
t
[
β(s)M(s, t) + σ(s)N(s, t)
]
ds
]
· v
=
[
β(t)M(t, t) + σ(t)N(t, t)
]
v.
(3.12)
To prove it, we need one more result.
Lemma 3.3 If f(·) ∈ Lp
F
(0, T ;Rm), m ∈ N, p ∈ (1, 2]. Then for almost t ∈ [0, T ], there exists
a sequence {ε
(t)
n } depending on t satisfying
lim
n→∞
ε(t)n = 0, lim
n→∞
1
ε
(t)
n
∫ t+ε(t)n
t
Et|fi(s)− fi(t)|ds = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m. a.s.
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Proof. Given f(·), we define f˜(·) as
f˜(·) := f(·)I[0,T ](·) + 0I(T,2T ](·).
For h > 0, there exists g(·) ∈ CF([0, 2T ];L
p(Ω;Rm)) such that∥∥f˜(·)− g(·)∥∥
L
p
F
(0,2T ;Rm)
≤ h.
Hence ∫ T
0
∫ t+ε
t
E|f˜(s)− g(s)|p
Rm
dsdt=
∫ ε
0
∫ T+u
u
E|f˜(v)− g(v)|p
Rm
dvdu ≤ hε.
As to g(·), there exists δ(h) > 0 such that
E|g(t1)− g(t2)|
p
Rm
≤ h, |t1 − t2| ≤ δ, t1, t2 ∈ [0, 2T ].
As a result, ∫ T
0
∫ t+ε
t
E|g(s)− g(t)|p
Rm
dsdt ≤ hε.
To sum up, for small ε > 0,
lim
ε→0
[1
ε
∫ T
0
∫ t+ε
t
E|f˜(s)− f˜(t)|p
Rm
dsdt
]
= 0.
Hence there exists {εn}n≥1 such that for almost t ∈ [0, T ],
lim
εn→0
1
εn
∥∥f˜(s)− f˜(t)∥∥p
L
p
F
(t,t+ε;Rm)
= 0.
Notice that
E
[ 1
εn
∫ t+εn
t
Et|f˜(s)− f˜(t)|Rmds
]p
≤
1
εn
∫ t+εn
t
E|f˜(s)− f˜(t)|p
Rm
ds.
Hence for almost t ∈ [0, T ], one selects a subsequence {ε
(t)
n }, such that
lim
ε
(t)
n →0
1
ε
(t)
n
∫ t+ε(t)n
t
Et
∣∣f˜(s)− f˜(t)∣∣
Rm
ds = 0. a.s.
The definition of f˜(·) leads to the desired conclusion.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. To prove (3.11), we first claim that there exists l ∈ (1, 2) such that
(M(·, t), N(·, t)) ∈ Ll
F
(Ω, C([t, T ];R))× Ll
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;R)), t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.13)
Moreover, using Itoˆ’s formula, for any t ∈ [0, T ], we know that (M(·, t), N(·, t)) satisfies the
first BSDE in (3.6). Therefore, (3.11) is implied by the uniqueness of BSDEs.
Actually, under (H1), X ∈ L2
F
(Ω, C([0, T ];R)). The result ofM(·, t) in (3.13) is then followed
from (H2).
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Notice that P1(·) is bounded, from (H1), P1D(ΘX + ϕ) ∈ L
2
F
(0, T ;R). Thanks to the
integrability in (H2), there exists l ∈ (1, 2),
E
[ ∫ T
0
|Λ1X |
2ds
] p
2
≤ E
{
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|X(t)|p
[ ∫ T
0
|Λ1|
2ds
] p
2
}
<∞,
E
[ ∫ T
t
∣∣Λ2Et[P3X ]∣∣2ds] l2 + E[ ∫ T
t
∣∣Λ2Et[P4]∣∣2ds] l2 <∞.
Then the result of N(·, t) in (3.13) is easy to see.
Next we prove (3.12). By the definitions of (M,N), for u := ΘX + ϕ, t ∈ [0, T ),
Et
∫ t+ε
t
(β(s)M(s, t) + σ(s)N(s, t))ds
= Et
∫ t+ε
t
[
(β(s)P1(s) + σ(s)Λ1(s))X(s) + β(s)P5(s) + σ(s)Λ5(s) + σ
2(s)P1(s)u(s)
]
ds
+Et
∫ t+ε
t
(β(s)P2(s) + σ(s)Λ2(s))Et(P3(s)X(s) + P4(s))ds.
Under (H2), it follows from Lemma 3.3 that there exists {ε
(t)
n } such that
lim
n→∞
[ 1
ε
(t)
n
Et
∫ t+ε(t)n
t
[
βP2 + σΛ2
]
ds
]
= β(t)P2(t) + σ(t)Λ2(t), a.s.
lim
n→∞
[ 1
ε
(t)
n
Et
∫ t+ε(t)n
t
(βP2 + σΛ2)(P3X + P4)ds
]
= (β(t)P2(t) + σ(t)Λ2(t))(P3(t)X(t) + P4(t)), a.s.
lim
n→∞
[ 1
ε
(t)
n
Et
∫ t+ε(t)n
t
[
(βP1 + σΛ1)X + βP5 + σΛ5 + σ
2P1u
]
ds
]
= (β(t)P1(t) + σ(t)Λ1(t))X(t) + β(t)P5(t) + σ(t)Λ5(t) + σ
2(t)P1(t)u(t). a.s.
(3.14)
For any fixed t ∈ [0, T ],
Et sup
s∈[t,t+ε]
Et|P3(s)X(s)|
2 ≤ Et sup
s∈[t,t+ε]
|P3(s)|
2 · Et sup
s∈[t,t+ε]
|X(s)|2 <∞, a.s.
hence by conditional dominated convergence theorem,
lim
ε→0
Et sup
s∈[t,t+ε]
|Et(P3(s)X(s))− P3(s)X(s)|
2 = 0. a.s.
Similarly one has
lim
ε→0
Et sup
s∈[t,t+ε]
|EtP4(s)− P4(s)|
2 = 0. a.s.
Consequently,
lim
ε→0
Et sup
s∈[t,t+ε]
|Et(P3(s)X(s) + P4(s)) − P3(s)X(s)− P4(s)|
2 = 0. a.s. (3.15)
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Using the first equality in (3.14), we then derive
lim
n→∞
[ 1
ε
(t)
n
Et
∫ t+ε(t)n
t
|βP2 + σΛ2|
∣∣∣Et(P3X + P4)− P3X − P4∣∣∣ds] = 0. a.s.
This, together with the second equality in (3.14), leads to
lim
n→∞
[ 1
ε
(t)
n
Et
∫ t+ε(t)n
t
(βP2 + σΛ2)Et(P3X + P4)ds
]
= (β(t)P2(t) + σ(t)Λ2(t))(P3(t)X(t) + P4(t)).
(3.16)
Eventually, our conclusion is followed by (3.16) and the third equality in (3.14).
For (X,u) ∈ L2
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R))× L2
F
(0, T ;R) satisfying (2.1), we define
Y := P1X +P2Et
[
P3X +P4
]
+P5,
Z := L2Et[P3X ] +P1σu+L2EtP4 +L5 +L1X,
(3.17)
where for s ∈ [0, T ], 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, Pi(s) satisfies
dP1(s) = −2r(s)P1(s)ds+L1(s)dW (s),
dP2(s) = −r(s)P2(s)ds+L2(s)dW (s),
dP3(s) = −r(s)P3(s)ds+L3(s)dW (s),
dP4(s) = −(β(s)P3(s) + σ(s)L3(s))u(s)ds+L4(s)dW (s),
dP5(s) = −
[
r(s)P5(s) + (β(s)P1(s) + σ(s)L1(s))u(s)
]
ds+ Λ5(s)dW (s),
P1(T ) = 2, P2(T ) = −2, P3(T ) = 1, P4(T ) = 0, P5(T ) = −γ1.
(3.18)
By (H0), for u ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;R), and p′ ∈ (1, 2), p ∈ (2,∞), (3.18) is solvable with
(Pi,Li) ∈ L
∞
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R))× Lp
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;R)), i = 1, 2, 3,
(Pj ,Lj) ∈ L
p′
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];R))× Lp
′
F
(Ω;L2(0, T ;R)), j = 4, 5.
(3.19)
Moreover, recalling (3.1), one has (P2,Λ2) ≡ (P2,L2).
Corollary 3.1 Suppose (H0) holds. Then
P
{
ω, Y (s, t) = Y (s, t), ∀s ∈ [t, T ]
}
= 1,
P
{
ω, Z(s, t) = Z (s, t)
}
= 1, s ∈ [t, T ]. a.e.
(3.20)
Moreover, for almost t ∈ [0, T ], there exists {ε
(t)
n }n≥1 such that lim
n→∞
ε
(t)
n = 0, and
lim
n→∞
1
ε
(t)
n
Et
∫ t+ε(t)n
t
[
β(s)Y (s, t) + σ(s)Z (s, t)
]
ds · v
=
[
β(t)Y (t, t) + σ(t)Z (t, t)
]
v.
(3.21)
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Proof. In Lemma 3.2, let Θ ≡ 0. Then
u = ϕ, (M,N) ≡ (Y ,Z ), (Pi,Λi) ≡ (Pi,Li), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Our conclusions are implied by Lemma 3.2.
Now let us turn to deal with the term with respect to (Y v,ε0 (·, ·), Z
v,ε
0 (·, ·)) in (3.7).
Lemma 3.4 Suppose (H0) holds, P1 is in (3.18). Then
lim
ε→0
[1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[
β(s)Y v,ε0 (s, t) + σ(s)Z
v,ε
0 (s, t)
]
ds · v
]
=
1
2
σ2(t)P1(t)v
2. a.s. (3.22)
Proof. Firstly let us look at the following equations on [t+ ε, T ],
X
v,ε
0 (s) = X
v,ε
0 (t+ ε) +
∫ s
t+ε
r(u)Xv,ε0 (u)du,
Y
v,ε
0 (s, t) = X
v,ε
0 (T )− Et[X
v,ε
0 (T )] +
∫ T
s
r(u)Y v,ε0 (u, t)du−
∫ T
s
Z
v,ε
0 (u, t)dW (u).
Using similar tricks as in Lemma 3.2, one can prove that
P
{
Y
v,ε
0 (s, t) =
1
2
P1(s)X
v,ε
0 (s)−
1
4
P2(s)Et[P2(s)X
v,ε
0 (s)], ∀s ∈ [t+ ε, T ]
}
= 1,
P
{
Z
v,ε
0 (s, t) =
1
2
L1(s)X
v,ε
0 (s)−
1
2
L2(s)Et[P2(s)X
v,ε
0 (s)]
}
= 1, s ∈ [t+ ε, T ]. a.e.
We continue to study (Xv,ε0 (·), Y
v,ε
0 (·, t), Z
v,ε
0 (·, t)) on [t, t+ ε] as follows,
X
v,ε
0 (s) =
∫ s
t
[
r(u)Xv,ε0 (u) + β(u)v
]
du +
∫ s
t
σ(u)vdW (u), s ∈ [t, t+ ε],
Y
v,ε
0 (s, t) = Y
v,ε
0 (t+ ε, t) +
∫ t+ε
s
r(u)Y v,ε0 (u, t)du−
∫ t+ε
s
Z
v,ε
0 (u, t)dW (u), s ∈ [t, t+ ε].
Similar as Lemma 3.2, by introducing
dK˜(s) =
1
2
(P2(s)β(s) +L2(s)σ(s))vds + L˜(s)dW (s), s ∈ [0, T ],
dK̂(s) = −
[
r(s)K̂(s) +
1
2
(P1(s)β(s) +L1(s)σ(s))v
]
ds+ L̂(s)dW (s),
K˜(t+ ε) = K̂(t+ ε) = 0,
we conclude that
P
{
Y
v,ε
0 (s, t)=
1
2
P1(s)X
v,ε
0 (s)−
1
2
P2(s)Et
[1
2
P2(s)X
v,ε
0 (s)−K˜(s)
]
+K̂(s), ∀s ∈ [t, t+ ε]
}
=1,
P
{
Z
v,ε
0 (s, t)=
1
2
L1(s)X
v,ε
0 (s)+
1
2
P1(s)σ(s)v−
1
2
L2(s)Et
[1
2
P2(s)X
v,ε
0 (s)−K˜(s)
]
+L̂(s)
}
=1,
with almost s ∈ [t, t+ ε]. We observe that
Et sup
s∈[t,t+ε]
|K˜(s)|2+Et
∫ t+ε
t
|L˜(s)|2ds ≤ Kεv2Et
∫ t+ε
t
[
|P2(s)|
2+|L2(s)|
2
]
ds,
Et sup
s∈[t,t+ε]
|K̂(s)|2+Et
∫ t+ε
t
|L̂(s)|2ds ≤ Kεv2Et
∫ t+ε
t
[
|P1(s)|
2+|L1(s)|
2
]
ds.
(3.23)
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As a result, for any s ∈ [t, t+ ε),
β(s)Y v,ε0 (s, t) + σ(s)Z
v,ε
0 (s, t)
=
1
2
[
β(s)P1(s) + σ(s)L1(s)
]
X
v,ε
0 (s) + β(s)K̂(s) + σ(s)L̂(s)
−
1
2
[
β(s)P2(s) + σ(s)L2(s)
]
Et[K̂(s)X
v,ε
0 (s)− K˜(s)] +
1
2
σ2(s)P1(s)v.
(3.24)
Recall that Et
[
sup
t∈[t,t+ε)
|Xv,ε0 (s)|
2
]
= O(ε), we then see that,

1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[
β(s)P1(s) + σ(s)L1(s)
]
X
v,ε
0 (s)ds = o(1),
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[
β(s)P2(s) + σ(s)L2(s)
]
Et[K̂(s)X
v,ε
0 (s)]ds = o(1).
From (3.23), one has
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[
β(s)K̂(s) + σ(s)L̂(s)
]
ds = o(1),
1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[
β(s)P2(s) + σ(s)L2(s)
]
Et[K˜(s)]ds = o(1).
To sum up, our desired conclusion is followed by
lim
ε→0
[1
ε
Et
∫ t+ε
t
[
β(s)Y v,ε0 (s, t) + σ(s)Z
v,ε
0 (s, t)
]
ds
]
=
1
2
σ2(t)P1(t)v.
We present the first main result of this section.
Theorem 3.1 If (Θ∗, ϕ∗) is an open-loop equilibrium operator in sense of Definition 2.2 such
that (H0), (H1), (H2) hold associated with (P ∗i ,Λ
∗
i ). Then{
G
∗
1 := β(P
∗
1 + P
∗
2 P
∗
3 − Y0γ2) + σ(Λ
∗
1 + Λ
∗
2P
∗
3 − Z0γ2) + σ
2P ∗1Θ
∗ = 0, a.s. a.e.
G
∗
2 := β(P
∗
2 P
∗
4 + P
∗
5 ) + σ(Λ
∗
5 + Λ
∗
2P
∗
4 ) + σ
2P ∗1 ϕ
∗ = 0. a.s. a.e.
(3.25)
Proof. For (Y0, Z0) in (3.6), we choose {ε
(t)
n }n≥1 in Lemma 3.2 such that
lim
n→∞
[ 1
ε
(t)
n
Et
∫ t+ε(t)n
t
[
β(s)Y0(s) + σ(s)Z0(s)
]
ds
]
= β(t)Y0(t) + σ(t)Z0(t). (3.26)
From Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.4, for almost t ∈ [0, T ],
0 ≤
[
G
∗
1 (t)X
∗(t) + G ∗2 (t)
]
v +
1
2
σ2(t)P1(t)v
2, (3.27)
where G ∗1 , G
∗
2 are defined in (3.25), X
∗ is in (2.4). For any x ∈ R, the arbitrariness of v implies
σ2(t)P1(t)v
2 ≥ 0, G ∗1 (t)X
∗(t) + G ∗2 (t) = 0.
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By the integrability of Θ∗, the following equation admits a unique strong solution,{
dX ∗(s) = (r(s) + β(s)Θ∗(s))X ∗(s)ds+ σ(s)Θ∗(s)X ∗(s)dW (s), s ∈ [0, T ],
X
∗(0) = 1.
(3.28)
Moreover,
[
X ∗
]−1
exists and is continuous. Suppose X∗0 is the equilibrium wealth process
corresponding to X∗(0) = 0. We have
P
{
ω ∈ Ω;X∗(t)−X∗0 (t) = X
∗(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
}
= 1.
The arbitrariness of x ∈ R indicates that G ∗1 X
∗ = 0, G ∗2 = 0. In addition, the existence of[
X ∗
]−1
implies that G ∗1 = 0 as well.
Remark 3.1 We point out one interesting fact. Suppose the conditions in Theorem 3.1 hold
and βP ∗5 +σΛ
∗
5 6= 0. Notice that the later hypothesis is easy to be fulfill when γ1 6= 0. We claim
that ϕ∗ 6= 0. Otherwise, according to (3.1), (P ∗4 ,Λ
∗
4) = (0, 0), and the second equality in (3.25)
becomes βP ∗5 + σΛ
∗
5 = 0, which is a contradiction. In other words, the equilibrium investment
strategy is the form of u∗ := Θ∗X∗+ϕ∗. Plugging it into wealth equation (2.1), we see that X∗
may not always be non-negative.
We give the second main result of this section.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose (H0) holds, (X ′, u′) satisfies (2.1), u′ is an open-loop equilibrium in-
vestment strategy, (Y ′,Z ′) is defined in (3.17) corresponding to u′. Then
β(t)Y ′(t, t) + σ(t)Z ′(t, t)− γ2X
′(t)
[
β(t)Y0(t) + σ(t)Z0(t)
]
= 0. a.s. a.e. (3.29)
Proof. Given equilibrium strategy u′, from Lemma 3.1, Corollary 3.1, Lemma 3.4, and above
(3.26), we have the following inequality for almost t ∈ [0, T ],
0 ≤
[
β(t)(Y ′(t, t) + Y0(t)γ2X
′(t))− σ(t)(Z ′(t, t) + Z0(t)γ2X
′(t))
]
v +
1
2
σ2(t)P1(t)v
2,
By the arbitrariness of v ∈ L2Ft(Ω;R), one has σ
2(t)P1(t)v
2 ≥ 0 and above result.
Remark 3.2 If coefficient r is deterministic, an equivalent, yet less explicit form of (3.29) was
obtained in Theorem 3.5 of [9]. Nevertheless, when r is random, Λ∗2 arise and is unbounded.
Moreover, the tricks of Proposition 3.3 in [9] fail. This explains the introducing of Lemma 3.3,
which helps us bypass the encountered difficulty. As a trade off, we only derive the necessary
condition, and leave the sufficiency verification for future study. More interestingly, it is just
the necessity equilibrium condition that will help us solve the uniqueness issue next.
4 The uniqueness of open-loop equilibrium controls
In this section, we discuss the uniqueness problem of open-loop equilibrium controls. To begin
with, we make the assumption as follows.
(H3) For some (Θ∗, ϕ∗), (3.1) admits solution (P ∗i ,Λ
∗
i ) such that σ
2P ∗1 ≥ δ > 0 and
P ∗1 + P
∗
2 P
∗
3 = 0, Λ
∗
1 + P
∗
3Λ
∗
2 + P
∗
2Λ
∗
3 = 0,
∫ ·
0
Λ∗1(s)dW (s) is BMO-martingale. (4.1)
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Theorem 4.1 Suppose (H0) holds and u∗ := Θ∗X∗ + ϕ∗ is an equilibrium control satisfying
(H1), (H2), (H3). If u′ is another open-loop equilibrium control, then u′ = u∗.
Proof. Given (Y ′,Z ′) in (3.17) corresponding with equilibrium pair (X ′, u′), we define{
Y¯ ′ := Y ′ −
[
P ∗1X
′ + P ∗2 Et(P
∗
3X
′ + P ∗4 ) + P
∗
5
]
≡ M1 + P
∗
2 EtM2,
Z¯ ′ := Z ′ −
{
P ∗1 σu
′ + Λ∗1X
′ + Λ∗2Et(P
∗
3X
′ + P ∗4 ) + Λ
∗
5
}
≡ Λ∗2EtM2 +M3,
where
M1 := (P1 − P
∗
1 )X
′ + (P5 − P
∗
5 ), M2 := (P3 − P
∗
3 )X
′ +P4 − P
∗
4 ,
M3 := (P1 − P
∗
1 )σu
′ + (L1 − Λ
∗
1)X
′ +L5 − Λ
∗
5.
(4.2)
Notice that in above we also use the fact that (P2,L2) = (P
∗
2 ,Λ
∗
2). By Itoˆ’s formula,
d
[
P ∗1X
′
]
=
{
− rP ∗1X
′ − (P ∗1 β + Λ
∗
1σ)
[
Θ∗X ′ − u′
]}
ds+
[
Λ∗1X
′ + P ∗1 σu
′
]
dW (s),
d
[
P ∗3X
′
]
= −
[
P ∗3 β + Λ
∗
3σ
][
Θ∗X ′ − u′
]
ds+
[
Λ∗3X
′ + P ∗3 σu
′
]
dW (s),
d
[
P ∗2 Et(P
∗
3X
′)
]
=−
[
rP ∗2 Et(P
∗
3X
′)+P ∗2Et
[
(P ∗3 β + Λ
∗
3σ)(Θ
∗X ′ − u′)
]]
ds+Λ∗2Et(P
∗
3X
′)dW (s),
d
[
P ∗2 EtP
∗
4
]
= −
[
P ∗2 Et
[
(P ∗3 β + Λ
∗
3σ)ϕ
]
+ rP ∗2 EtP
∗
4
]
ds+ Λ∗2EtP
∗
4 dW (s),
and
d
[
P1X
′
]
=
{
− rP1X
′ + (P1β +L1σ)u
′
}
ds+
[
L1X
′ +P1σu
′
]
dW (s),
d
[
P3X
′
]
=
[
P3β +L3σ
]
u′ds+
[
L3X
′ +P3σu
′
]
dW (s),
d
[
P2Et(P3X
′)
]
=
{
− rP2Et(P3X
′) +P2Et
[
(P3β +L3σ)u
′
]}
ds+L2Et(P3X
′)dW (s),
d
[
P2EtP4
]
= −
[
P2Et
[
(P3β +L3σ)u
′
]
+ rP2EtP4
]
ds+L2EtP4dW (s).
Then it is a direct calculation that
dM1 =
[
− rM1 + (P
∗
1 β + Λ
∗
1σ)[Θ
∗X ′ + ϕ∗ − u′]
]
ds+M3dW (s),
dM2 = (P
∗
3 β + Λ
∗
3σ)[Θ
∗X ′ + ϕ∗ − u′]ds+M4dW (s),
M1(T ) = M2(T ) = 0,
(4.3)
where
M4 :=
[
(L3 − Λ
∗
3)X
′ + (P3 − P
∗
3 )σu
′ +L4 − Λ
∗
4
]
.
On the other hand, notice that{
Y
′(s) := Y¯ ′(s, s) = M1(s) + P
∗
2 (s)M2(s),
Z
′(s) := Z¯ ′(s, s) = Λ∗2(s)M2(s) +M3(s), s ∈ [0, T ],
(4.4)
are well defined. From Theorem 3.2, Theorem 3.1, a necessary condition for the equilibrium
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control u′(·) is
0 = β(s)(Y ′(s, s)− γ2X
′(s)Y0(s)) + σ(s)(Z
′(s, s)− γ2X
′(s)Z0(s))
= β(s)Y′(s) + σ(s)Z′(s) +
[
β(s)(P ∗1 (s) + P
∗
2 (s)P
∗
3 (s)− γ2Y0(s)) + σ(s)(Λ
∗
1(s)
+Λ∗2(s)P
∗
3 (s)− γ2Z0(s))
]
X ′(s) +
[
β(s)(P ∗5 (s) + P
∗
2 (s)P
∗
4 (s))
+σ(s)[Λ∗5(s) + Λ
∗
2(s)P
∗
4 (s)]
]
+ σ2(s)P ∗1 (s)u
′(s)
= [β(s)Y′(s) + σ(s)Z′(s)]− σ2(s)P ∗1 (s)(Θ
∗(s)X ′(s) + ϕ∗(s)− u′(s)). a.s.
(4.5)
Plugging it into (4.3), for s ∈ [0, T ], we arrive at
dM1 =
[
− rM1 +
[P ∗1 β + Λ
∗
1σ]
σ2P ∗1
[
βY′ + σZ ′ − σP ∗2 M4
]]
ds+M3dW (s),
dM2 =
(P ∗3 β + Λ
∗
3σ)
σ2P ∗1
[
βY′ + σZ ′ − σP ∗2 M4
]
ds+ M4dW (s),
M1(T ) = M2(T ) = 0,
where
Z
′ := M3 + Λ
∗
2M2 + P
∗
2 M4. (4.6)
Using Itoˆ formula to P ∗2 M2, and recalling (4.1),
d
[
P ∗2 M2
]
=
[
P ∗2 (P
∗
3 β + Λ
∗
3σ)(σ
2P ∗1 )
−1
[
βY′ + σZ ′ − σP ∗2 M4
]
−rP ∗2 M2 + Λ
∗
2M4
]
ds+ [Λ∗2M2 + P
∗
2 M4]dW (s)
=
[
−
(
P ∗1 β + (Λ
∗
1 + P
∗
3Λ
∗
2)σ
)
(σ2P ∗1 )
−1
[
βY′ + σZ ′ − σP ∗2 M4
]
−rP ∗2 M2 + Λ
∗
2M4
]
ds+ [Λ∗2M2 + P
∗
2 M4]dW (s).
Again thanks to (4.1), we obtain the following equation for (Y′,Z ′)
dY′ =
[
− rY′ + Λ∗2M4 − P
∗
3Λ
∗
2σ
−1
[
P ∗1
]−1[
βY′ + σZ ′ − σP ∗2 M4
]]
ds+Z ′dW (s)
=
[
− rY′ + P ∗2Λ
∗
2σ
−1
[
βY′ + σZ ′
]]
ds+Z ′dW (s).
Recall Y′(T ) = 0 and the BMO property of Λ∗2, we obtain that
P
{
ω ∈ Ω; Y′(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ [0, T ]
}
= 1, P
{
ω ∈ Ω; Z ′(s) = 0
}
= 1, s ∈ [0, T ],
with the help of Theorem 10 in [4]. Notice that
−
(P ∗3 β + Λ
∗
3σ)
σ2P ∗1
σP ∗2 =
[
P ∗1 β + (Λ
∗
1 + P
∗
3Λ
∗
2)σ
]
σP ∗1
=
[β
σ
+
Λ∗1
P ∗1
−
Λ∗2
P ∗2
]
.
Hence  dM2 =
[β
σ
+
Λ∗1
P ∗1
−
Λ∗2
P ∗2
]
M4ds+M4dW (s), s ∈ [0, T ],
M2(T ) = 0.
Thanks to the BMO property of Λ∗1 in (4.1), and Theorem 10 in [4], we have (M2,M4) = (0, 0).
Putting it back to (4.4), (4.6), one has (M1,M3) = (0, 0). Hence Z
′ = 0. Recalling Y′ = 0, and
above (4.5), one has u′ = Θ∗X ′ + ϕ∗. Our conclusion follows naturally.
16
Remark 4.1 Similar as [9], we adopt the following tricks: introducing (Y¯ ′, Z¯ ′), (Y′,Z′), using
the previous necessary conditions, and proving (Y′,Z′) = (0, 0). Nevertheless, when coefficient
r is random instead of deterministic, Λ∗2 6= 0, Z¯
′ depends on parameter t, and the tricks in
Theorem 5.2 of [9] do not work any more.
To figure out this issue, we point out two important observations. In the first place, thanks
to the definitions of (Y ′,Z ′) in (3.17), we can further represent explicitly (Y¯ ′, Z¯ ′), (Y′,Z′)
by means of introduced Mi, i = 1, 2, 3. In the second place, the equations satisfied by Mi
can fortunately be derived by direct calculations. By introducing Z ′ in (4.6) and some subtle
deductions, we end up with a one-dimensional linear BSDE of (Y′,Z ′), and get the desired
conclusion.
4.1 Mean-variance problems with constant risk aversion
In this part, we discuss the mean-variance problem with constant risk aversion γ1, and γ2 = 0.
We first introduce the corresponding Riccati system. To this end, for s ∈ [0, T ], we consider
dP ∗1 = −
{
2rP ∗1 + (P
∗
1 β + Λ
∗
1σ)Θ
∗
}
ds+ Λ∗1dW (s),
dP ∗2 = −rP
∗
2 ds+ Λ
∗
2dW (s),
P ∗1 (T ) = 2, P
∗
2 (T ) = −2, Θ
∗ := −
Λ∗1
σP ∗1
+
Λ∗2
σP ∗2
.
(4.7)
If we define
P ∗3 := −
P ∗1
P ∗2
, Λ∗3 := −
Λ∗1
P ∗2
+
P ∗1Λ
∗
2
[P ∗2 ]
2
,
then {
dP ∗3 = −
[
rP ∗3 + (P
∗
3 β + Λ
∗
3σ)Θ
∗
]
ds+ Λ∗3dW (s),
P ∗3 (T ) = 1.
(4.8)
Moreover, Θ∗ = −
Λ∗3
P∗3
. Using (P ∗3 ,Λ
∗
3), (P
∗
1 ,Λ
∗
1), for s ∈ [0, T ], we look at
dP ∗4 = −
[
P ∗3 β + Λ
∗
3σ
]
ϕ∗ds+ Λ∗4dW (s),
dP ∗5 = −
[
rP ∗5 +
[
P ∗1 β + Λ
∗
1σ
]
ϕ∗
]
ds+ Λ∗5dW (s),
P ∗4 (T ) = 0, P
∗
5 (T ) = −γ1,
ϕ∗ := −
β(P ∗2 P
∗
4 + P
∗
5 ) + σ(Λ
∗
5 + Λ
∗
2P
∗
4 )
σ2P ∗1
.
(4.9)
We verify the assumption in Theorem 4.1 one by one.
By Appendix B, C in [14], there exists (P ∗i ,Λ
∗
i ), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 satisfying (H2), and (H1)
holds with previous defined (Θ∗, ϕ∗).
According to the definitions of (P ∗3 ,Λ
∗
3), the first two equality in (4.1) hold. In addition,
from Remark 3.6 in [14], we see that
∫ ·
0 Λ
∗
1(s)dW (s) is a BMO-martingale.
To sum up, by applying Theorem 4.1, we obtain the uniqueness of open-loop equilibrium
investment strategy u∗ := Θ∗X∗ + ϕ∗.
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Remark 4.2 We point out some interesting facts.
(1) If r is deterministic, by the uniqueness of BSDE (4.8), see Appendix B of [14], one has
Λ∗3 = 0 which leads to Θ
∗ = 0. In other words, the appearance of Θ∗ in u∗ is determined by the
randomness of r.
(2) Even though the risk aversion parameter is a constant, the equilibrium investment strat-
egy u∗ is allowed to depend on initial wealth as along as r keeps some randomness.
(3) If β, σ are deterministic, or even β = 0, Θ∗ still does not degenerate as long as r is
random. However, if r becomes deterministic, Θ∗ = 0, even though β, σ are random. These
two aspects show the different roles of r, β, σ in effecting Θ∗.
(4) By introducing
dM1 = −
[
K1M1 +K2N1
]
ds+N1dW (s),
dM2 = −
[
K3M1 +K4N1 +K5N2
]
ds+N2dW (s),
M1(T ) = −γ1, M2(T ) = 0.
where Ki are defined as,
K1 := (r −
βΛ∗2
σP ∗2
), K2 := −
Λ∗2
P ∗2
, K3 :=
[P ∗3 β + Λ
∗
3σ]
σ2P ∗2 P
∗
3
β,
K4 :=
[P ∗3 β + Λ
∗
3σ]
σ2P ∗2 P
∗
3
σ, K5 := −
[P ∗3 β + Λ
∗
3σ]
σP ∗3
,
we can rewrite ϕ∗ as
ϕ∗ =
βM1 + σN1
σ2P ∗2 P
∗
3
−
N2
σP ∗3
(4.10)
If r is deterministic, it is a direct calculation that
Θ∗ = 0, ϕ∗ =
[βγ1
2σ2
−
N2
σP ∗3
]
e−
∫
T
·
r(s)ds. (4.11)
(5) Our uniqueness ensures that there is no more pair of (Θ∗, ϕ∗) satisfying above properties.
4.2 Mean-variance problems with state-dependent risk aversion
In this part, we consider the mean-variance problems when γ1 = 0, and r be deterministic.
At first, we consider the following system of equations,
dP ∗1 (s) = −
{
2r(s)P ∗1 (s) + (P
∗
1 (s)β(s) + Λ1(s)σ(s))Θ
∗(s)
}
ds+ Λ∗1(s)dW (s),
dP ∗2 (s) = −r(s)P
∗
2 (s)ds, s ∈ [0, T ],
P ∗1 (T ) = 2, P
∗
2 (T ) = −2,
(4.12)
where
Θ∗ := −
1
2βP
∗
2 γ2 − σΛ
∗
1
σ2P ∗1
.
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The solvability of (P ∗1 ,Λ
∗
1) was discussed in Section 5 of [8]. If we define
P ∗3 := −
P ∗1
P ∗2
, Λ∗3 := −
Λ∗1
P ∗2
,
we have{
dP ∗3 (s) = −
[
r(s)P ∗3 (s) + (P
∗
3 (s)β(s) + Λ
∗
3(s)σ(s))Θ
∗(s)
]
ds+ Λ∗3(s)dW (s),
P ∗3 (T ) = 1.
(4.13)
According to [8], [9], assumptions (H1), (H2), (H3) hold with u∗ := Θ∗X∗, ϕ∗ = 0. From
Theorem 4.1, the uniqueness is easy to see.
Remark 4.3 Notice that our procedures in proving above uniqueness are distinctive and simpler
than the analogue in Section 5 of [9]. More details along this can be found in Remark 4.1.
Remark 4.4 In our situation, if γ2 = 0, it follows from Subsection 4.1 that Θ
∗ reduces to zero.
Similar conclusion also happens when β = 0. These facts indicate the important role of γ2, β
in keeping the non-degeneration of Θ∗ or u∗.
Remark 4.5 Let us compare the deterministic r and γ2. If γ2 6= 0, Θ
∗ may not equal to zero
even when r = 0. However, if γ2 = 0, Θ
∗ must equal to zero even when r 6= 0. This shows that
γ2 is more essential than deterministic r.
5 Concluding remark
In this paper, the uniqueness of open-loop equilibrium investment strategies for dynamic mean-
variance portfolio selection problems is discussed. A unified method is proposed to treat mean-
variance problems in two different settings and some interesting aspects are revealed as well.
We emphasize that there is no essential difficulty to extend the conclusions here into the case
when both investment strategy and Brownian motions are multi-dimensional.
As to the problems with random risk-free return rate and state-dependent risk aversion,
the existence and uniqueness of open-loop equilibrium investment strategies are still under
consideration. We hope to discuss it in future publications.
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